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Globalisation has intensified competition to such an extent that the cor-
porations, merely with one’s own resources, cannot achieve acceptable
success any longer. Objectives, which had been set-up prior to estab-
lishing the alliance in order to justify the investment, frequently will
not be possible to achieve if during the integrative period revolutionary
methods of change are not applied, to which one can classify restruc-
turing and reengineering. Therefore, it is essential to be successful, not
only in rules and principles of strategic alliances but in the methods of
radical changes.
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Strategic Partnerships
Globalisation, which actually integrates all parts of the world into a joint
global market, has intensified competition to such an extent that the
corporations, merely with one’s own resources, cannot achieve accept-
able success any longer. Therefore a joint (combined) use of assets of a
number of corporations appears and, in a such a way, it is possible to
achieve objectives which a corporation on its own would not be capable
of achieving. The general objective of linkage and co-operation is found
in increased competitiveness, i. e. improved developmental capabilities.
Strategic partnership can be:
• strategic business (non-equity) alliance or
• equity (ownership) linkage (merger, acquisitions, take-over).
Strategic business alliance is not based on capital transactions, as par-
ticipating corporations retain their own legal entities (status) and inde-
pendence. Capital linkage is about altered ownership proportions and
the business co-operation should therefore intensify. The relationship
should be a more long-term one, although it is not necessary that the
equity linkage includes elements of strategic business co-operation.
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Equity linkages could hardly be a priori defined as strategic partner-
ships since such a relationship is dominated by the stronger corpora-
tion (instead of a ‘2+ 2= 5’ outcome e. g. a ‘3+ 1= 5’). Since equity link-
ages primarily represent the finalisation or the final step of prior strate-
gic non-equity co-operations, in this case one could also place capital
linkages among equity partnerships. From such a discussion one could
conclude that capital linkages, in certain cases, play the role of strate-
gic business partnerships (when achieving the ‘2+ 2= 5’ outcome) and,
in some other cases, do not comprise elements characterised as partner-
ship (e. g. ‘straightforward’ investments having exclusively financial ob-
jectives). Take-overs, mergers and acquisitions can therefore, on the one
hand, represent finalisation of a strategic business alliance and, on the
other, also the highest evolutionary level of a particular strategic alliance.
As aforementioned, in this case, there is no reason not to classify equity
linkages as strategic partnerships, regardless of whether they emerge as
a developmental step in an evolution of a particular strategic alliance
or come into existence directly, without an evolutionary course. Joint-
ventures, take-overs, mergers, acquisitions and demergers, therefore, es-
sentially represent merely a capital-supported form of one or another
form of strategic linkages, if, indeed, such a content is present.
In any case it is true that at assessing the nature of contents and signifi-
cance of a particular linkage, the substantial content and the significance
of the business co-operation should be taken into account and not its ex-
ternal form, taking into account, indeed, that many of these do not have
a formal configuration.
Non-equity business alliances, which represent up to 90%of all strate-
gic linkages according to certain assessments (Lynch 1993, 29), neverthe-
less prevail in comparison to equity linkages, although the latter are more
visible and echo more in professional circles and among the public.
Strategic alliances and partnerships are modern forms of obtaining
and increasing competitiveness in the global market environment. The
growing competition from all perspectives demands more co-operation
between the corporation and its suppliers, between the corporation and
its clients, between the corporation and its competitors and those carry-
ing out out-sourced functions. By globalising international operations,
when national and regional borders are being blurred or fading away and
consequently the classical definition of product origin, the dimensions of
competition process also change.
Today some authors (Schonberger 1996, 15) even speak of a ‘part-
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nership era’ which commenced in the 90s and succeeded the preced-
ing ‘manufacturing era’ (1940–1950, characterised by scarcity of goods),
‘marketing era’ (1950–1965, characterised by unexploited capacities), ‘fi-
nancial era’ (1965–1980) and ‘quality era’ (1980–1990, characterised by in-
tercontinental competition). The beginning of the partnership era can be
traced to the early 80s, accompanied by rapid growth of intercontinental
operations and technological headway.
The number of strategic alliances or partnerships cannot be estima-
ted,É since for certain non-equity partnerships one cannot find oYcially
published or otherwise accessible data. If one would attempt to present
the ‘partnership era’ in numbers and amounts of internationalÊ joint
ventures, mergers and take-overs, then the numbers and amounts of
these (totalling minimally to a 10% ownership stake) in the period from
1987 to 1999 increased by 7 times i. e. from less than $100 billion in 1987
to $720 billion in 1999 (un 2000, 10). The rate of growth both of the in-
ternational and the national equity linkages during the period between
1980 and 1999 amounted to an astonishing 42% on a yearly base. In 1999
equity linkages already represented 8% of the world’s gdp while in 1980
merely 0.3% (un 2000, xiv).
The total amount of all equity linkages on the planetary level exe-
cuted in 1998 is estimated at $2.400 billion (The Economist 1998). In 2001
the amount of international acquisitions, mergers and take-overs is sup-
posed to be in excess of $1.100 billion (grand total almost $3.500 billion).
The amount of equity linkages in Europe and the us in 2001 has already
reached $1.830 billion and, due to the known events of 2001 in the us, it
decreased to $1.360 billion (decrease by 26%) in 2002. The period 1998-
2001 some authors characterise as ‘merger mania’.
Alliances – a Stage Process
Entering into equity and strategic business non-equity alliances is a
highly demanding procedure, which does not include only stages of car-
rying out the purchase (take-overs) or signing the contract (strategic
alliance), but also involves a set of tasks, duties and proceduresË as such,
which can be classified into three time periods, in regard to the course of
emerging of a particular alliance:
• period prior to entering into alliance,
• period of entering into alliance,
• period consequent to entering into alliance.
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table 1 Periods and procedures of the alliance process
Period Procedures
Prior to entering into alliance Defining and reassessment of strategic orientations
Search for and assessment of partners and of the
feasibility of the integration
Selection of the partner(s)
Selection of the type of integration
Strategic and financial assessment of the integration
Drafting plans for the integrative process
Entering into alliance Introductory discussions
Letter of intent
Negotiations
Entering into contract
Appointing the responsible alliance manager
Public announcement
Consequent to entering
into alliance
Rapid integration
Restructuring and re-engineering
Learning from the partner
Resolving conflicts
Reconfiguration of the alliance
In the continuation we will only discuss the time period consequent
to entering into alliance.
Time Period Consequent to Entering into Alliance
The time period consequent to entering into alliance is designated as the
period of integration, the post-take-over period, the post-take-over inte-
gration or also the operational stage of the integration. It can be further
divided into two stages:
• stage of carrying out the corporate integration, which is usually
characterised by profound changes (restructuring, business process
reengineering, renewal of the corporation);
• stage consequent to carrying out the integration, which is intended
for achieving the planned synergy eVects (post-integration stage).
The duration of the period intended for carrying out the operational
integration cannot be fully defined, since each alliance has its own par-
ticularities. Certain research studiesÌ (e. g. Devine 2002, 19) state that the
post-take-over period lasts for approximately two years, while the act of
take-over itself lasts for 3–6 months, and the rest is intended for tran-
sitional adjustment (soft balancing, further restructuring, cultural inte-
gration).
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The integration in strategic alliances can be:Í
• procedural (includes combining two systems and procedures of
participating corporations on operational, monitoring and strate-
gic levels);
• physical (assets and resources – consolidation of programmes,
manufacturing technologies, projects, operational-manufacturing
units, infrastructure);
• managerial and socio-cultural (the most demanding problem – in-
cludes transfers of managers, modifications to the organisational
structure, development of a consistent corporate culture, models of
strategic operations, motivational system and installing a new lead-
ership).
The integration must be rapid in order to achieve the synergy eVects
as soon as possible, i. e. achieve the pre-set objectives. The rapidity and
eVectiveness of the integration is largely dependent on the preparatory
period (prior to the integration). Certain research (Devine 2002, 156) has
determined that:
• 40% of all changes take place during the first two months conse-
quent to establishing the alliance;
• more than half of the latter (20%) take place immediately after the
alliance;
• changes continue at a high pace, but have a rapidly decreasing ten-
dency during the next six months;
• after nine months more than 80% of changes had been initiated.
Processes referring primarily to equity linkages are highly stressful and
cause anxiety, concern, anger, cynicism and depression among partic-
ipating parties. This is one of the reasons why the integrative activi-
ties should be launched immediately after the formal entering into co-
operation (or even prior to this), since fear and uncertainty can block
achieving jointly pre-set objectives if such a state persists for a longer
period.
This can also cause the so-called ‘merger syndrome’ (Devine 2002, 157)
which addresses six common problems influencing the success of the op-
eration in one way or another:
• deteriorating communications;
• poor productivity;
• increased parochialism and less team play;
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Integration Evaluation Adjustment Evaluation Reconfiguration
figure 1 Adjustment and/or renewal of alliance
• power struggles;
• reduced commitment to corporate goals;
• a tendency to bail out by leaving the organisation.
The ‘merger syndrome’, therefore, can lead not only to inability for
achieving the pre-set synergy eVects, formed by the mutual value-added,
but can also lead to the joint outcome being even on the negative balance
side considering the costs that have already risen.
After the essential modifications towards the integrated corporations
have been carried out, a significant part of the post-integration period is
reverse learning from the partner, as the integrated corporations should
possess complementary knowledge and skills which will lead to achiev-
ing the pre-set strategic objectives of the integration.
Integrative processes, despite the abundance of guidelines and in-
structions on carrying out the processes, often lack the so-called ‘co-
operational mentality’ and even more in the case of integrating non-co-
operative cultures. Therefore, learning for co-operation is an inevitable
condition for successful functioning of the alliance. One must not over-
look the fact that the transfer of knowledge, i. e. reverse learning, will not
take place automatically.
Deviations, conflicts or poor functioning of the alliance or some of
its parts might occur during its establishment or on its emergence, re-
gardless of the preparative period being put to good use for assessing
the future alliance, therefore, adjustments of the alliance should be pre-
planned in order to adjust to new circumstances. In this case one might
not talk of deep-penetrating changes but merely fine, soft adjustments
and balancing (evolutionary changing). If the integration does turn out
to be inappropriate, i. e. not functioning, then the process should be
repeated from the very beginning i. e. a reconfiguration of the alliance
should be carried out (revolutionary changes).
‘A gap appears to exist between what experts say about m&as and what
managers experience [. . .]. Only a few m&a transitions can be neatly
packaged into a set of processes, or a single magic formula’ (Devine
2002, 11).
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A combination of order and chaos, planned and unexpected, is a char-
acteristic of almost every equity linkage. Managing alliance is as much an
art as a science. Equity linkages arematters which ‘happen’ to people who
can join or oppose the process. The process of establishing strategic al-
liance often contains improvisations, adjustments, putting out fires and
learning, not merely carrying out a pre-planned strategy.
Restructuring and Business Reengineering
Most frequently the process of integrating connected corporations will
only be possible by using revolutionary methods of change, as which
one can classify restructuring and business process reengineering. If a
particular structure of a corporation or one of its individual sectors is
not appropriate in regard to circumstances demanded by the new (al-
tered) environment, the existing structure is to be changed and com-
pletely renewed. This process, representing a transition from the existing
structure to a new one (programme-market, manufacturing, technolog-
ical, financial, organisational, personnel, ownership, ecological, develop-
mental) which enables greater successfulness and eYciency of corporate
operations, is designated as restructuring. Restructuring is one of the
methods of revolutionary changes and a way to achieve renewal of the
corporation as a result of strategic alliances.
The basic distinction between the revolutionary methods of changesÎ
and the evolutionary methods of achieving changes lies in the frequency
of the former being less common, being more profound and widely
aimed, having a greater intensity and risk during a shorter time frame
and simultaneously demanding certain sacrifices. The range of sacrifices
can include tangible assets (selling premises, giving up traditional pro-
grammes, withdrawing from long-term equity and business alliances,
sell-out of so-called ‘social-standard’ capabilities, decreasing resources
for non-commercial investments, etc. . . .) and intangible assets (reduc-
ing the number of employees, replacing and making experts redundant,
selling patents or brands, etc. . . .). Due to the very sacrifices the revolu-
tionary methods of changes are not welcomed as pleasant but cause fear,
uncertainty, and distress.
When addressing restructuring one should bear in mind the following
important rules:
• it takes place in various areas (changing structures in one area de-
mands changing structures in other areas);
• it derives from the fundamental strategies of the corporation;
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• its departure points are programme-market structures (restructur-
ing of programmes and markets);
• it contains all characteristics of the revolutionary methods of chan-
ges (already mentioned).
Restructuring usually cannot be carried out in an individual area (e. g.
corporate function) regardless of others, and the eVects will be visi-
ble only when modifying several area structures. Change of the prod-
uct portfolio (restructuring of the programme) can also demand al-
tering: the organisational structure of the corporation (organisational
restructuring), the technology (technological restructuring), the finan-
cial resources (financial restructuring), the human resources (personnel
restructuring), the informational system (informational restructuring),
etc. Sometimes various changes are dependant on or triggered by own-
ership restructuring (alteration of the ownership structure). The need
for a balanced and simultaneous restructuring is particularly applicable
in order to relieve a crisis which cannot be relieved otherwise by mere
financial restructuring, while other areas remain unchanged.
The consequences of restructuring processes can also be uncertain
when projects are carried out unsuccessfully or the achieved outcomes
fall below the expectations in regard to sacrifices and eVorts. Rock and
Rock (1990, 43) determined that half of the unsuccessful restructur-
ing projects caused losses to their owners. Platt (1998, 144) also states
that only 50% of the projects achieve the pre-set objectives (for cost-
reductions the result is slightly higher at 61%). The actual problem in
these cases are sacrifices suVered as restructuring needed to be imple-
mented in the form of a radical alteration, while methods of step-by-step
changes had either been neglected and underestimated, or else such an
alteration is demanded by external (altered) circumstances (e. g. entering
into partnership).
Programme-market restructuring represents a transition from the
prior structural combination of products or services, and markets, to
a new structure which must achieve greater successfulness (profitability)
and eYciency of corporate functioning (productivity, cost-eYciency).
In regard to such a restructuring, which takes place within a complex
relation, one must consider the market (the selected segment of cus-
tomers) and the programme (product, service), since it is most fre-
quently true that the same oVerings cannot be positioned in a new mar-
ket or the new programme in the prior market. Therefore the essence
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of the programme-market restructuring lies in the marketing approach.
From the selection of needed and available measures, those in the area
of programme-market changes are common both in the period of crisis
solving and the period of corporate development. The research among
221 marketing experts (Shaw andMazur 1997, 10) indicated (marks 1 to 5)
that the altered conditions in the market (marketing) environment are
the very foundation for programme-market restructuring.
The process of programme-market restructuring is, most frequently,
conducted in two areas:
1. the internal aspect, aimed at achieving the optimal position of the
programme in regard to mutually intertwined and dependant cor-
porate functions and the organisational units of the corporation;
2. themarket (external) aspect, aimed at exploring possibilities for im-
plementation of the existing or the new programme in the selected
markets i. e. segments.
Similarly to the programme-market, restructuring in the develop-
mentalÏ and technological area is connected to the transition of the
existing structures to the new ones which enable the corporation to
achieve a more rapid, market-orientated development, greater eYciency
of functioning and application of modern technological equipment. De-
velopmental restructuring is, therefore, aimed at designing a structure of
products and services which would contain more value-added, in other
words, at achieving greater levels of technological sophistication of the
product and of the processes. Technological restructuring, on the other
hand, represents applying such scientific methods, knowledge and skills
which will enable manufacturing of the planned products.
If the primary objective of technological and developmental restruc-
turing is to design a structure of products and services containing a
greater value-added, then one can derive the following objectives of re-
structuring processes in the mutually connected and dependent areas of
development, technology and manufacturing:
• orientation of all activities toward customers;
• decrease of internal (passive, waiting) and external (introduction to
the market) non-productive periods;
• simultaneous engineering;
• limitation and cancellation of activities which do not contribute to
the value of the product (service);
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• integration of various areas and processes;
• relative cut-oVs (reductions) in costs;
• increase of productivity and flexibility by introduction of modern
methods.
Restructuring of the manufacturing function represents the installa-
tion of such a structure of manufacturing methods and approaches and,
on the other, processes and tasks which will ensure completion of se-
lected (ordered, planned) products in the most eYcient way.
Restructuring in the area of human resources should be discussed in
a wider context, best represented by hr management. The tasks of man-
aging employees are the following:
1. discovering and developing capabilities of personnel which are used
by various sectors of the corporation in order to satisfy customers,
achieve competitive advantages and contribute to the collective
value of the corporation;
2. directing a variety of relations between managers, employees and
others, and their interests, in accordance with corporate strategies.
Restructuring of the human resources area represents installing a new
structure in regard to employees either as an entirety or as individual
parts of the corporation (e. g. the management, manufacturing workers,
particular functions or sectors, etc.). Similarly to other areas restructur-
ing measures must also derive from the general strategy of the corpora-
tion and, therefore, have to be carefully prepared, even more, since they
refer directly to personnel (relations, emotions, co-operation, collective
values, behaviours, viewpoints, values as ‘softer’, less visible factors in
comparison to objectives, structures, markets, finances, techniques as
‘harder’, more visible factors – Perlitz et al. 1996, 342). One must not ne-
glect the point that employees (hr, personnel) are viewed today as the
greatest potential of a corporation. Restructuring in the hr area is also a
possibility for establishing a new organisational scheme, a new systemi-
sation of tasks and a new system of rewards.
The hr area is inseparably connected to the organisational structure
of the corporation, although one rarely speaks of organisational restruc-
turing, since these changes are a consequence of programme-market,
manufacturing-technological and personnel changes. It would be com-
pletely senseless to set the change of the organisational structure as the
primary objective, regardless of the fundamental orientations of the cor-
poration, its developmental level, programmes, methods of management
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and available resources. On the other hand it is also true that changes to
other areas cannot be carried out without modifying the organisation.
Lately, restructuring or renewals of informational systems are fairly
common as consequences of altered circumstances of a corporation’s
functioning, extremely dynamic events in a corporation’s environment
and general headway in the area of informational systems, processes and
hardware. Therefore, in a corporate milieu, the term informational tech-
nology is more commonly used and refers to the suitability of computer
hardware, also software, in the widest possible sense. It is also true that
projects of reengineering in this area prevail, focusing on the process and
the predominating significance of the informational technology.
Changing external resources of financing from less favourable (short-
term, more expensive) to more favourable (long-term, less expensive)
ones, is usually a highly desired measure in financial restructuring but is
accompanied by abundance of diYculties in praxis due to the unwilling-
ness of banking creditors to encounter setbacks in regard to their placing
and needs for ensuring available resources which would replace the pre-
ceding. The remains of liquid resources, which are a consequence of all
other measures, must be placed to those areas where the eVect would be
the greatest. Measures, classified into this group, can be: postponement
of due liabilities (reprogramming, prolongation, moratorium); replace-
ment of existing loans with new ones (refinancing); writing-oV calcu-
lated interest; debt to equity swap; procurement of additional external
developmental resources of financing (equity) while accounting for the
financial lever; decreasing investments having long-term eVect and ad-
vancing smaller investments having rapid eVect – these can be market-,
technology- or personnel-orientated.
In comparison to restructuring, whose primary objectives are mod-
ifications of various structures in a corporation, reengineering brings
about ‘a fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business pro-
cesses to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary mea-
sures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed’ (Hammer
and Champy 1994, 32).
Reengineering, just like restructuring, is a method of revolutionary
change and, therefore, embodies all general features of such radical
changes. Reengineering and restructuring are not mutually incompat-
ible methods although they derive from diVerent starting-points, since
in a corporation they can run parallel to one another or even be inter-
twined.
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table 2 Cost savings delivered by mergers and acquisitions
Sector Percentage of answers
Head-count reduction 66
Buying and merchandising 60
Supply chain 60
Procurement 48
Manufacturing 35
Warehousing/distribution 32
New product development 32
Outsourcing 25
Research and development 24
Source Devine 2002, 166.
With regard to the definition and contents of reengineering, one could
indicate its essential ingredients: focus on corporate processes, radical
changes, dramatic improvements and a multidisciplinary approach. In-
stead of organisational structure or function, a reengineering project
focuses on corporate processes which can be interpreted as a set of con-
nected activities which engage an input (from suppliers), transform it
and produce an output (for the customer). The corporate process, there-
fore, includes those activities which are crucial for an agile delivery of
products and services to the customers and simultaneously contribute to
greater quality and low costs. The processes can be classified as core,
main or sub-processes and also as partner-orientated, internally- or
customer-orientated. Corporate processes are not the responsibility of
an individual function but include a range of activities, dispersed over
individual areas.
Due to anticipated and needed changes, which have to be carried out
in a rapid and consistent manner during the post-integrative period if
to achieve the planned synergy eVects, a take-over can often prove itself
as insuYciently flexible to achieve developmental objectives and is fre-
quently succeeded by merger or acquisition.
An investigation into integrative processes of Slovenian corporations
(e. g. Lahovnik 2001) finds that measures during the period consequent
to alliance mostly refer to various profound transformations (table 3).
Thus, while linking two or more corporations, various modes of re-
structuring take place which are also visible in the relocation of previous
activities, processes and tasks.
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table 3 Most frequent measures during the period consequent to integration
in the case of Slovenia
Measures during post-integrative period Percentage of answers
Reorganisation of marketing activities 84
Reorganisation of supply activities 84
Management training programmes 82
Introduction of new sales programmes 76
Financial consolidation 64
Selling of non-core business assets 58
Management reorganisation 58
Replacements of members of the top-management team 51
Reducing the number of employees 40
Source: Lahovnik 2001.
Strategic Alliances and Resolving and Preventing Crisis
For various corporations, or even branches, entering into strategic part-
nerships at a particular developmental level is not merely a strategic pos-
sibility and opportunity but a business necessity, since it will be the only
possible way to preserve one’s competitive position and prevent crisisÐ
in the future. On the other hand, strategic business alliances and eq-
uity linkages enable (re)solving corporate crisis, while the process of
re(solving) includes all available assets of partner corporations and a si-
multaneous search for synergy eVects.
Strategic equity and non-equity alliance is, therefore, significant both
during the period of preventing crisis and also during the period of re-
solving crisis.
The objective of today’s strategic alliances, which have not occured
due to major diYculties in one or even both partner corporations, is an
increase of collective (global) competitiveness which actually represents
preventing a crisis from emerging. A corporation, which otherwise de-
velops relatively successfully, will start to lag on a certain developmental
level behind its competitors which have integrated their own forces and
achieved the synergy eVects that cannot be achieved by an ‘independent’
corporation.
In cases of strategic business or equity alliance when one of the part-
ners is facing crisis, such an alliance can bring about the solution of crisis
for the corporation in question. Since in this case the alliance combines
an economically stronger partner with a weaker one, the latter cannot
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table 4 Mergers and acquisitions by acquiree situation in the case of 170 analysed
companies in the period 1985–1990
Situation Percentage of cases
Strategically troubled 25
Financially troubled 16
Joint growth opportunities 13
Dependent on related company 12
Divesting non-core business 12
fac pullout 8
Target of aggressive move 7
Others 7
Source: Bleeke and Ernst 1993, 116.
await an equal position in regard to integrative processes which actually
represent a sacrifice for the corporation in question. The same is true for
all cases of crisis resolving.
The reason behind a stronger partner linking with a weaker one facing
acute crisis, while there is a possibility of a chain crisis reaction, is that
the corporation facing crisis possesses:Ñ
• a verified manufacturing-sales programme which – due to all other
required potentials (financial, personnel, technological, etc.) being
absent – cannot be appropriately developed and introduced to the
market;
• suitable technology which cannot be optimally exploited due to dif-
ficulties in the marketing-sales area;
• an excellent team of experts who cannot assert their knowledge and
skills since the corporation faces unsurmountable financial or other
problems;
• such assets which can be utilised in order to gain much greater eY-
ciency and profitability by the partner;
• a diVerentiated domestic or/and foreign distributive network, but
cannot maintain it due to financial diYculties.
In order to successfully avoid the dangers, which derive from link-
age with a corporation in crisis, pre-integrative processes take place in
practice which utilise, when required, the introduction of radical resolv-
ing activities in the corporation facing crisis (voluntary or compulsory
agreement; disinvestments; ‘cleaning’ balance sheets; even programmed
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– controlled bankruptcies, etc.) or less risky methods (e. g. take-over by
acquisition of assets).
Difficulties and Traps of Alliance
Although strategic alliances represent one of the most significant mod-
ern forms of international business, the rate of their successfulness i. e.
survivability is not high, since, on the average, it ranges merely from 30
to 45%. By unsuccessfulness of the integration we do not only mean that
the linked corporations fail or go bankrupt (which is otherwise com-
pletely possible), but by the same token, we designate such a partnership
that has not achieved the pre-set synergy objectives (an alliance is un-
successful also in those cases when the potentials of two corporations are
merely summed up i. e. the outcome is ‘2+ 2= 4’).
Such, a relatively low rate of successfulness can be ‘justifiable’, since
strategic alliances are the most demanding form of organisational rela-
tionships where one can consider that co-operation is actually another
form of competition, that harmony is not the most crucial criterion
of successfulness, that co-operation has its limitations when corpora-
tions must address competition compromises, and that reverse learning
is most important (Hamel by Ramu 1997, 74).
If we summarise the findings of various research studies and cases on
unsuccessfulness of alliances, then we can gather the causes into the fol-
lowing groups:
• short duration and lack of systematic and planned preparations
during the period prior to closing the deal (deals with no prior anal-
ysis and assessments and incorrect selection of the partner, i. e. tar-
get corporation);
• overestimated (overoptimistic) assessments of eVects (unrealistic
synergy eVects);
• incorrect (overestimated) price or a ‘bite to large’ (combined with
overestimated eVects, an exhausted (dried-up) corporation);
• unaccomplished complementarity of manufacturing, program-
ming and marketing structures;
• disorganised, weak and diYcult communications (external and in-
ternal);
• managing diYculties and lack of systematic supervision (inexperi-
ence at integrating, insuYcient monitoring of the integration);
• disharmony of cultures and management styles;
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table 5 Varying of integration successfulness
Partner a
Advantages Disadvantages
Partner b Advantages 2+ 2= 5
synergy
integration
2+ 2= 3 or 4
counterproductive
integration
Disadvantages 2+ 2= 3 or 4
counterproductive
integration
2+ 2= 0
destructive
integration
Source: Büchel et al. 1998, 47.
• internal opposition to changes (also departures of key personnel);
• integration being too late and too slow (poor operational imple-
mentation);
• diYculties at transfer of knowledge and skills between partners;
• underestimated competition (competition reacts to equity transac-
tions by its own strategies and does not allow others to achieve syn-
ergy eVects at their expense);
• changes in the environment or in partner corporations (demand
modifications of strategies and management or sell-out of the own-
ership stake).
On the average, alliances are more successful when the environment is
more turbulent (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993), while on long-term equity
linkages can prove more successful.
Since both equity and non-equity alliances, worldwide and domestic,
have a high rate of unsuccessfulness, as already mentioned, their prepa-
rations should be approached in a planned, suYciently analytical and
systematic manner, which is also visible in the fact that integrations do
not come into existence ‘overnight’ but only after a longer period of pre-
testing of partners during ‘usual’ co-operation. Integrations implicate
dual risks: a possibility of the alliance failing and a possibility of link-
ing corporations failing.ÉÈ
As easily as strategic alliances arise, so too they can also end, since
they have their own life cycleÉÉ which is only partially dependant on each
individual life cycle of participating corporations. Non-equity alliances
can result into:
• equity merger, acquisition or take-over;
• demerger;
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• reorganisation or restructuring of one or both partners.
It is obvious that successful partnerships compensate for the disad-
vantages of unsuccessful ones, since otherwise it would not be so pop-
ular as a strategic tool in the global environment. Certain data indicate
that alliances accumulate 18% of all incomes of the 500 largest American
corporations (The Economist 1998).
Successfulness of a particular alliance is often assessed merely through
financial indicators, such as increased market value of shares, dynamics
of share value of the participating partners in a certain period prior and
consequent to take-over, etc.
However, financial criteria are just one aspect of examining the suc-
cessfulness of an alliance, whereas other indicators should be taken into
account for determining the successfulness of integrated corporations.
Assessment of alternative paths for each of the participating entities is
significant by all means and answers the following questions: would any
of the particular corporations survive in a medium-term period?; what
would be the value of its shares by that point in time?; what would be the
value of future profits by that point in time?, etc.
Successfulness of a particular alliance cannot be assessed merely by
financial indicators, but one can speak of four groups of criteria (eco-
nomical, strategic, behavioural and learning aspects; Büchel et al. 1998,
198), whereas from the professional literature it emerges (Ittner and Lar-
cker 2001, 388) that a huge discrepancy exists between the significance of
strategic alliances and qualitative criteria for assessing their successful-
ness.
One should also stress that the results of alliance probably will not be
identical for both (all) participants, but it is important that these should
be proportional in regard to pre-set objectives, which can diVer from one
participant to another.ÉÊ
Triple Role of Restructuring
Restructuring has a triple role from the aspects of threat and perspective
of the corporation’s position:
• crisis solving,
• crisis preventing,
• development of the corporation.
Resolving of crisis by itself demands a range of integral area restructur-
ings (programme-market, organisational, financial . . .), whose purpose
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is to initially halt negative developments. Therefore, restructuring at this
stage is rapid, less extensive and non-integral, as short-term eVects are
being sought. Only at the second stage, when establishing of develop-
mental foundations along with profitable operations is being addressed,
are integral and long-term restructuring projects being carried out, hav-
ing medium- and long-term eVects. Therefore, the role of restructuring
during the first stage of crisis solving (halting negative developments) is
less stressed, while later it has priority.
Restructuring has even a more significant role for preventing crisis
and development, either as internal (organic) growth or growth by the
helping hand from partners, in comparison to acute crisis solving it-
self, when measures having short-term positive eVects take priority. Al-
though development contains activities, which simultaneously represent
preventing of crisis arising, various restructurings can take place merely
in order to adjust the corporation to new circumstances in the environ-
ment along the process, using less extensive modifications and, by doing
so, prevent the emergence of a latent or acute crisis, since the corpora-
tion does not develop as rapidly as its environment (competition, altered
consumer behaviour, etc.). On the other hand, the corporation can im-
prove its competitive position and developmental possibilities through
appropriate strategic planning, by the internal structures being continu-
ally renewed.
It is not possible to expect long-term success without an appropriate,
pre-planned approach during analysis of the actual environment and po-
tential partners, which would be based on assessment of the possibilities
for fulfilment of mentioned conditions within the strategic partnership.
Many successful integrations have arisen from long-term co-operation
due to exactly this, since a thorough assessment of the partner’s suitabil-
ity for a further strategic equity linkage or a mere business alliance, was
possible during this period.ÉË
Entering into alliances must, as aforementioned, be well deliberated
and planned and must be a part of an integral corporate strategy taking
into account all stated conditions for a successful strategic alliance. It is
not possible to anticipate all events and conflicts during the preparatory
period, whereas success cannot be ensured through precisely defining
rules. Here one can state the following recommendations:
• the process of integration must commence prior to signing the con-
tracts;
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• it is recommended to appoint the responsible manager having ex-
clusively these tasks and addressing only the process of integration;
• in the integration period the process of restructuring is to com-
mence as soon as possible,
• integration does not refer merely to business activities but also to
the cultures of the partners.
Corporate linkage must have suYcient flexibility in order to respond
to changes either in its environment or in the life cycle of the alliance
itself, in other words, the principles of co-operation, which had been set
prior to establishing the integration, should be repeatedly reassessed.
Strategic equity and non-equity alliance has become, regardless of our
will, an integral part of modern strategic thinking and acting. It is obvi-
ous that equity and non-equity alliance, despite themany obstacles, traps
and diYculties which hinder the rate of successfulness of alliances, has
many advantages and benefits pointing the trend steeply towards con-
tinuation. According to certain findings, more than a half of all corpo-
rations worldwide already participate in various forms of alliances, and
the proportion is still increasing, since the rate of success should grow by
increased experience and scientific research into alliances.
Objectives, which had been set-up prior to establishing the alliance in
order to justify the investment (in a financial, time, eVort sense, and op-
portunity possibilities), frequently will not be possible to achieve if dur-
ing the integrative period revolutionary methods of change are not ap-
plied, to which one can classify restructuring and reengineering. There-
fore, it is essential to be successful, not only in the rules and principles of
strategic alliances but also in the methods of radical changes – such are
restructuring and reengineering – in order to successfully prepare and
implement a strategic partnership which will give rise to synergy eVects
and not result in a failure, since otherwise we remain far away from the
planned objectives.
Conclusion
Globalisation has intensified competition to such an extent that the cor-
porations, merely with one’s own resources, cannot achieve acceptable
success any longer. Objectives, which had been set-up prior to establish-
ing the alliance in order to justify the investment, frequently will not be
possible to achieve if during the integrative period revolutionary meth-
ods of change are not applied, to which one can classify restructuring and
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reengineering. Entering into equity and strategic business non-equity al-
liances is a highly demanding procedure, which involves a set of tasks,
duties and procedures as such, which can be classified into three time
periods, in regard to the course of emerging of a particular alliance: pe-
riod prior to entering into alliance, period of entering into alliance and
period consequent to entering into alliance.
During the post-integrative period the anticipated and needed chan-
ges have to be carried out in a rapid and consistent manner in order to
achieve developmental objectives and planned synergy eVects.
In this article the following recommendations have been stated: the
process of integration must commence prior to signing the contracts; it
is recommended to appoint the responsible manager having exclusively
these tasks and addressing only the process of integration; in the inte-
gration period the process of restructuring is to commence as soon as
possible; integration does not refer merely to business activities but also
to the cultures of the partners.
Notes
1 Lynch (1993, 18) states that well-known strategic alliances should be
complemented by at least as many alliances which remain covert as
hidden competitive advantages.Well-known consultant houses (Booz,
Allen & Hamilton) estimate a formation of more than 32,000 strategic
partnerships in the period 1996–1998.
2 Characterised as international capital transactions are those which
combine equity of incorporated entities from two or more countries.
According to certain estimates (un 2000, xiv) the international eq-
uity mergers and take-overs represent 25% of all mergers, acquisitions
and take-overs, while the trend points to increasing.
3 More on various aspects and descriptions of strategic co-operations
and integrations can be found in the following papers: e. g. Aiello and
Watkins 2001, 39–40; Bleek and Ernst 1993, 45; Büchel et al. 1998, 52;
Connell, LaPlace, and Wexler 2000, 7.
4 According to Devine (2002, 106), the process of integration has four
stages, also designated as the ‘4c’: putting commitments into eVect
(commitments): openness and trustfulness; defined roles, objectives,
milestones, managerial structure . . . (coordination); gathering infor-
mation and ideas, listening, swot analysis (co-operation); joint activ-
ities, wider inclusion (collaboration).
Managing Global Transitions
Restructuring and Business Reengineering in Integrative Processes 91
5 Ramu (1997, 87) distinguishes among the following types of integra-
tion: strategic integration, tactical integration, operational integra-
tion, interpersonal integration and cultural integration.
6 DiVerent associations use a most diversified range of terms for ex-
pressing radical changes as a managerial method which, on the other
hand, often lack definitions of its contents and a critical and principled
approach.
7 By the developmental restructuring one usually bears in mind restruc-
turing of the entire corporation along with introduction of all required
areas in order to achieve (more rapid) development of the corporation
as an integrity. We are using the term here to discuss restructuring in
the area of development (the developmental corporate function) as a
section of a corporation.
8 Crisis is a short-term, less favourable, undesired and critical state in
a corporation which has arisen due to both external and also internal
causes and directly endangers the future existence and development of
the corporation (Dubrovski 2000, 2).
9 In regard to this, acquisitions and take-overs are divided into two
groups: those, which represent an opportunity (opportunity driven),
and those which are driven by problems in target corporations (prob-
lem driven) (Lynch 1993, 71).
10 Since integrations in Slovenia frequently took place as amatter of fash-
ion or a matter of corporate necessity, involving excessive activity of
share takeovers and purchase of shares, various forms of competition
over acquisition of a particular corporation and other equity trans-
actions in order to achieve even non-business or non-economical in-
terests, while development or even urgency for crisis solving in one’s
own corporation has been neglected. Thus, obsession with takeovers
can have negative consequences which are visible by: the exhaustion of
the corporation (appropriate resources should be procured for take-
overs); shift of focus from one’s own diYculties to others’; redirection
of developmental investments (resources devoted to takeover activi-
ties instead of investments into one’s own technology, hr and mar-
kets); inappropriate approach to crisis solving (resolving of crisis be-
ing sought through takeovers instead of carrying out profound inter-
nal measures).
11 Examples of life cycles for some alliances can be found in the literature
by Spekman, Isabella, and MacAvoy (2000, 133–7).
12 A study on key factors of successful management of integrated corpo-
rations (interviews with 50 corporate representatives) classified clar-
ity of purposes and objectives as the primary factor, followed by ap-
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pointment of a quality management and planning in advance (Hamill
1993, 3).
13 A research into 45 acquisitions in Slovenia (Lahovnik 2001), based on
questionnaires and interviews, found that 47% of partners had not
cooperated prior to linking.
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